Posted: 8/9/2014 4:53 AM
The trial judge's opinion is here.I haven't given it more than a skim, but it looks like an attempt to play a variation on the old Marbury v. Madison trick of making a sweeping legal opinion but narrowing the result to avoid getting slapped down.Judge Wilken makes some pretty big shifts in her interpretation of normal antitrust law and most of the opinion reads more like an argument to the inevitable appeal court than a final post-trial judgment. But then after ruling that her interpretation of antitrust law controls, she makes a fairly insignificant ruling that the NCAA members have to take some of the money to pay total cost of attendance rather than just grant-in-aid amounts. Which is pretty meaningless, since the power 5 have already stated they are going to raise the stipends.It's one of the oldest judicial tricks. The Supreme Court pulled it early on in their successful gambit to become a third branch of government in Marbury vs. Madison. Basically, back in 1800 President Adams got beat by Jefferson, so Adams tried to pack the courts with a bunch of lame duck appointments like Marbury's. But since the mail service was pretty nonexistent in 1800 some of the lame duck appointments didn't get delivered. When Jefferson took office he ordered his SecState (Madison) to deep six any appointments that hadn't been delivered. Marbury sued. It went to the supreme Court and Jefferson's people argued that the Court had no right to interfere in disputes between Congress and the Prez, and told the Court that Jefferson wouldn't deliver the appointment no matter what they said (a threat later carried out in a totally different case by Prez Jackson who famously said, Mr. Marshall made he ruling, now he can try to enforce it"). So, the Supreme Court led by Justice Marshall wrote a sweeping opinion claiming that the Supreme Court had the inherent power to be the final judge of any dispute between Congress and the Prez, but then also ruled that a minor appointment enabling law was unconstitutional so Marbury wouldn't get the appointment anyhow. Basically, they made a claim to a ton of power, but then ruled in such a way as to avoid testing that power.Judge Wilken's decision looks to trying the same trick. Turn a lot of antitrust law on its head and lay a foundation for shifting how it works in the future, but make a tiny ruling that just requires the NCAA to do what they were going to do anyway to try to avoid the appeal.A golden oldie of a scam, but like all scams it really only works on the unwary. It's been tried many times since by lower courts, and mostly gets appealed anyway because defendants realize that the precedent will bite them later. It really only works for the Supremes since they can't be appealed. A lot of people think Roberts was doing something like this in the Obamacare decision--namely killing the old scope of the interstate commerce clause power while giving the Prez what he wanted so that it wouldn't be challenged.
Last edited 8/9/2014 4:57 AM by PiratesRoost
Posted: 8/9/2014 4:56 AM
Posted: 8/9/2014 3:06 PM
Posted: 8/10/2014 12:36 PM
Alaric wrote: Seems like sort of an odd ruling but judges are known to make stuff up now instead of following written law. Where is the $5,000 figure coming from. Is that just some made up amount from a judge? I have a feeling that the judge knew that the NCAA was totally in the wrong legally, but tried to come up with the best ruling possible for the establishment. It is kind of like the recent cases of reverse discrimination where the plaintive is given only one dollar in damages. I think this has happened in Georgia and Michigan.
Posted: 8/11/2014 2:27 AM
I'm pretty sure $5K is the difference Emmert said there was between the current amount of the grant-in-aid scholarship and the "total cost of attendance" at most power 5 level schools.
Posted: 8/11/2014 10:17 AM
Posted: 8/11/2014 10:44 AM
Posted: 8/11/2014 11:39 AM
Posted: 8/11/2014 11:43 AM
BearEEGoodSir wrote: The ruling is being appealed anyway.If the findings of fact hold, there is the potential for that number to be adjusted in the future by all manners of claims. Moreover, it is likely that it would give the union case a better chance of succeeding if it held. ...
Posted: 8/11/2014 12:40 PM
PiratesRoost wrote: Alright, I'll read it Friday on the plane.I can say that holding human beings to be the "supply" both the commodity supplied as well as "supplier" that are effected by restraints on trade is wholly new to antitrust law. A district court or two over the century plus of antitrust law might have made an employee ruling (i.e. Google/Apple case) but I'm fairly sure no circuit court, let alone the Supreme Court, has ever allowed antitrust law to displace employment law.
The NCAA argues that Plaintiffs cannot prevail under a monopsony theory because they have not presented evidence of an impact on price or output in a “downstream market.” Trial Tr. 2766:16-:22 (Stiroh). They cite Dr. Stiroh’s testimony that the only way that a restraint on an input market -- such as a market for recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights -- can give rise to an anticompetitive harm is if that restraint ultimately harms consumers by reducing output or raising prices in a downstream market. Whatever merit Dr. Stiroh’s views might have among economists, they are not supported by the relevant case law. The Supreme Court has indicated that monopsonistic practices that harm suppliers may violate antitrust law even if they do not ultimately harm consumers. In Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), the Supreme Court considered whether an agreement among sugar refiners to fix the prices they paid for sugar beets constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. It concluded that “the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured . . . are sellers, not customers or consumers.” Id. at 235. Notably, the Court reached this conclusion despite a vehement dissent from Justice Jackson noting that the price of sugar had not been affected by the refiners’ agreement. Id. at 247. The majority’s decision, thus, “strongly suggests that suppliers . . . are protected by antitrust laws even when the anti-competitive activity does not harm end-users.” Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court’s references to the goals of achieving ‘the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress’ and of ‘assur[ing] customers the benefits of price competition’ do not mean that conspiracies among buyers to depress acquisition prices are tolerated. Every precedent in the field makes clear that the interaction of competitive forces, not price-rigging, is what will benefit consumers.” (emphasis added)).
This is consistent with a long line of cases, including some decided by the Ninth Circuit, recognizing that restraints on competition within a labor market may give rise to an antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners’ Ass’n, 272 U.S. 359, 365 (1926) (holding that a multiemployer agreement among ship owners restrained trade in a labor market for sailors); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (holding that a conspiracy among oil industry employers to set salaries at “artificially low levels” restrained trade in a labor market and noting that “a horizontal conspiracy among buyers [of labor] to stifle competition is as unlawful as one among sellers”); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a multiemployer agreement in the paper lithograph label industry may restrain trade in a “market for personal services”). It is also consistent with the many recent cases, some of which are cited above, recognizing the validity of antitrust claims against the NCAA based on anticompetitive harms in a labor market. See, e.g., Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346 (recognizing that the NCAA’s scholarship rules may restrain trade in a “labor market for student-athletes” and noting that “labor markets are cognizable under the Sherman Act”); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that an NCAA rule capping compensation for entry-level coaches restrained trade in a “labor market for coaching services” and noting that “[l]ower prices cannot justify a cartel’s control of prices charged by suppliers, because the cartel ultimately robs the suppliers of the normal fruits of their enterprises”);
PiratesRoost wrote: BearEEGoodSir wrote: The ruling is being appealed anyway.If the findings of fact hold, there is the potential for that number to be adjusted in the future by all manners of claims. Moreover, it is likely that it would give the union case a better chance of succeeding if it held. ...Can't say I'm terribly surprised. The NCAA must know that if allowed to stand this ruling would just keep coming back to bite them. FWIW, I think the findings of law are far more damning to the NCAA. It's applying antitrust law at all that hurts them, the facts only determine how much. The NCAA's dream scenario is a finding that recruting is not an arena where antitrust law can operate.
BearEEGoodSir wrote: The ruling is being appealed anyway.If the findings of fact hold, there is the potential for that number to be adjusted in the future by all manners of claims. Moreover, it is likely that it would give the union case a better chance of succeeding if it held. ...
Last edited 8/11/2014 12:42 PM by MrPacTen
Posted: 8/11/2014 6:23 PM
Posted: 8/11/2014 11:45 PM
Last edited 8/11/2014 11:46 PM by PiratesRoost
Posted: 8/11/2014 11:49 PM
Posted: 8/12/2014 12:06 AM
EricCartmann wrote: Cartmann did not realize there were 100,000 potential Plaintiffs.. heck even if only 25% of that makes a claim, that is $125 Million! So the potential cost to the NCAA is huge even for this one case. $5000 to each plaintiff is not much, but the laywers get about 30% of each $5000. If it does get to $125 Million, that is about $41 Million to the Lawyers! If 50% of the potential plaintiffs makes claims, that is $82 Million to the Lawyers! Once again this proves why class action lawsuits are retarded. Only ones that makes out ore the Lawyers....
Posted: 8/12/2014 1:02 PM
Posted: 8/12/2014 1:22 PM
@PR: It sounds like your fundamental objection to the Wilken ruling is the idea that in general, monopsonistic anti-competitive behavior is not subject to anti-trust law, including but not limited to rule of reason (you spend some time objecting to per se treatment of monopsonistic behavior, but since that wasn't used here, I am not quite sure of the relevancy of that discussion). If this is not your actual objection, feel free to ignore the rest of this post. Presuming that this is your objection, though...
1) My understanding is that anti-trust very much applies to monopsonstic anti-competitive behavior that harms suppliers. There are a number of cases where courts have ruled that debatably anti-competitive behavior that only harms competitors and NOT suppliers or end-user consumers is legal (harm to competitors != harm to markets), but since here we're discussing harm to suppliers (as opposed to harm to competitors like NAIA schools, D3 schools, the NFL, potential other competing leagues etc.) I feel pretty comfortable pushing those cases largely to the side as far as analyzing relevant precedent goes.
2) I think we get at the key point when you say "claiming that harm to sellers had replaced harm to the market (aka consumers) as the test for antitrust violations". If my reading of your commentary is correct, you subscribe to the theory that "consumers" (or purchasers of a product) must be harmed for there to be any anti-trust violation (more or less the "Chicago school" if I understand terminology correctly).Or, in other words, that anti-trust law provides essentially zero protection to producers, and ONLY exists to protect end-users. So if, for instance, car-makers conspired to hold down the price of steel, or steel-makers conspired to hold down the wagers of steel workers, this would therefore be OK under anti-trust law.But this interpretation seems very problematic, not just in terms of common sense, but the very case - Mandeville vs American Crystal Sugar ( http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...4&invol=219) that you cite (bolded emphasis mine):It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act,15 even though the price-fixing was by purchasers,16 and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers...The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated
In other words, the REALLY key point of the decision is not the missed "treble damages" part, but the (also missed) part that explicitly says that antitrust law applies to ANYONE harmed, not just end-point consumers. I'm not aware of any Supreme Court level precedent that argues against this basic point. And I do think that it's notable that Wilken cites the dissent there, since the dissent raised the argument that only end-point consumer harm mattered, and the ruling opinion of the court explicitly rejected that line of thinking.
3) There are other examples of the "only end-point consumer harm matters" theory, but they generally seem to get shot down. The NCAA in its closing brief explicitly cited a monopsony type case (page 23) Kamine vs Rochester ( http://www.leagle.com/decision...amp;amp;%20ELEC ), citing the languageThe problem with this type of monopsony power, then, is that ultimately it can injure consumers by forcing up the price of the end product. Where the risk of that happening is slight or nonexistent, however, monopsony power per se does not create an antitrust concern. That's a US District Court case, and seems pretty clear-cut that monopsonistic conduct is actually OK as long as it just harms suppliers and not consumers.HOWEVER, that precise legal conclusion was explicitly rejected on the 10th Circuit Appeals Court (which I understand has higher precedent authority) in Telecor vs SW Bell ( http://openjurist.org/305/f3d/...lephone-company ), with language including:The two district court cases cited by Southwestern Bell — both of which contain language suggesting that harm to end-users is at least a relevant consideration in determining whether a monopsony is actionable under antitrust law, see Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P., 908 F.Supp. at 1203 (stating that, where there is little risk that monopsony "can injure consumers by forcing up the price of the end product ... monopsony power per se does not create an antitrust concern"); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F.Supp. 274, 280 (D.Mass.1995) (noting that "[o]nly with control of a downstream market can the monopsonist decrease output and raise prices") — are inadequate to overcome the unmistakable import of the case law cited above.andAlthough Southwestern Bell is correct that antitrust laws were "especially intended to serve consumers," that hardly suffices to prove that a monopolist may act with impunity so long as end-use consumer prices are unaffected.andOn its merits, Southwestern Bell's monopsony argument is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court's treatment of monopsony cases strongly suggests that suppliers (under Southwestern Bell's theory of the market, the location owners) are protected by antitrust laws even when the anti-competitive activity does not harm end-users. In its leading monopsony case, the Supreme Court stated:It is clear that the [anti-competitive buyer's price-fixing] agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the [Sherman] Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers.
If there are district court or higher precedent cases that specifically argue that producer harm (as opposed to competitor harm) is NOT actionable under antitrust law, AND have not subsequently been shot down by higher appeals courts, I'd be quite curious to see them. But at this point, the legal precedent seems awfully clear on that point.
4) There's also plenty of legal theory backing up the conclusion that producer harm very much matters in antitrust law. Consider: - http://digitalcommons.law.seat...context=faculty -The most basic purpose of antitrust law is to protect consumers from such behavior. A closely related goal is to protect small suppliers like farmers and ranchers from price fixing by large buyers. When buyers with market power agree to depress the prices they pay small, competitive suppliers, they exploit them in the same way that colluding sellers exploit consumers. - http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlrev/arc...kwood_Lande.pdfIn both sell-side and buy-side cases, in other words, the ultimate goal is the same—preventing firms that have unfairly acquired power from exploiting their trading partners, buyers or sellers. In short, the goal is competitive prices (and other terms) for all...Many commentators have pointed out that Bork's terminology was confusing or misleading because economic efficiency, as commonly measured, consists of the SUM of consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. The more accurate synonym for economic efficiency it total welare - http://www.roberthjackson.org/...anti-trust-law/The antitrust laws, perhaps more than any other public policy, owe their existence to the insistence of the farmers. They first came into State legislation in the agricultural States as a result of farm support. They took their place in the national statute books in 1890 supported largely by the influence of the farm protest movement. They constituted a part of what was known as the "granger laws" and came to enactment as the result of the granger movement or "populist" uprising which caused more jitters among conservatives of that day than the New Deal does today....Let us consider the farmer as an individual seller. When the farmer attempts to sell his produce he has no bargaining power that compares with that possessed by his only buyers. He finds a concentrated control and ownership of the only channels by which his produce may reach its ultimate market. Thirteen manufacturers bought 64 percent of the 1934 tobacco crop; three manufacturers alone bought 46 percent of the 1934 crop. I take it, no one will doubt that when three buyers take 46 percent of a crop those three are in a position to fix the price. They would be strange persons if they did not take advantage of the power they have
So in terms of legal theory, the Chicago interpretation that you apparently seem to be backing (if I'm reading you right) doesn't seem to have much backing in general theory or explicit precedent.
Posted: 8/12/2014 3:27 PM
Digging deeper into that Mandeville case ( http://openjurist.org/334/us/219 ), since you've explicitly said:
The bolded part makes the context a bit more clear. The Mandeville court was not creating new law or claiming that harm to sellers had replaced harm to the market (aka consumers) as the test for antitrust violations. The Mandeville court was just saying that it did not matter that the sellers would get the trebled damages so long as the violation was the sort of harm to the market that the Sherman Act had outlawed. And you see that in later quotes throughout the opinion: "Again, as we have said, the vital thing is the effect on commerce, not the precise point at which the restraint occurs or begins to take effect in a scheme as closely knit as this in all phases of the industry." "It is rather whether the statute's policy has been violated in a manner to produce the general consequences it forbids for the public and the special consequences for particular individuals essential to the recovery of treble damages."
Essentially, you seem to be arguing at least one of a couple things:1) The S.C. did not claim that "harm to sellers had replaced harm to the market (aka consumers) as the test for antitrust violations". I'm not quite sure how far you're going with this. If you simply mean that it would be wrong to totally ignore end consumer harm in all future antitrust cases and only care about producer harm, I'd agree wtih that statement, but it's basically a straw man, since no one is arguing that point. To me, it instead reads like you are arguing that it'd be wrong to ever use producer harm as an explicit test of anti-competitive behavior, and that only end-user consumer harm is a valid antitrust test. Again, if I'm misreading you, please let me know.2) Embracing a "producer harm" antitrust standard (at least in cases involving monopsony behavior and producer harm) would be "creating new law".
wrt point #2, I'd be very curious to see analyses of antitrust law, either before or after Mandeville, that argue that monopsonistic behavior is exempted as long as it only harms producers (not competitors, but producers further up the supply chain), provided that consumers are unarmed. So far I've seen very little to this effect and a whole lot to the opposite effect.wrt point #1, it's fairly clear that in this case, the SC very much used a "producer harm" standard (or at least used it in conjunction with other items). Every time they talk about producer harm their language embraces it as a relevant standard of anti-competitive behavior, and there are a lot of mentions: Consider (I excerpt out a lot of the decision commentary, including a LOT of commentary relating to how broad of a mandate antitrust law has, and discussion about why they get to regulate local commerce as well as explicitly and directly interstate commerce), various bolded items are mine:The main question is whether, in the circumstances pleaded, California sugar refiners who sell sugar in interstate commerce may agree among themselves to pay a uniform price for sugar beets grown in California without incurring liability to the local beet growers under the Act. Narrowly the question is whether the refiners' agreement together with the allegations made concerning its effects shows a conspiracy to monopolize and to restrain interstate trade and commerce or one thus affecting only purely local trade and commerce....The material facts pleaded, which stand admitted as if they had been proved for the purposes of this proceeding, may be summarized as follows: Petitioners' farms are located in northern California, within the area lying north of the thirty-sixth parallel. The only practical market available to beet growers in that area was sale to one of three refiners...Sometime before the 1939 season the three refiners entered into an agreement to pay uniform prices for sugar beets. The mechanics of the price-fixing arrangement were simple. The refiners adopted identical form contracts and began to compute beet prices on the basis of the average net returns of all three rather than the separate returns of the purchasing refiner. Inevitably all would pay the same price for beets of the same quality....The specific allegation is added that the sugar manufactured by respondent and the other northern California refiners from beets grown in the region 'was, during all of said period (1938 to 1942), sold in interstate commerce throughout the United States.'...By way of legal as well as ultimate factual conclusions the amended complaint charged that respondent had unlawfully conspired with the other northern California refiners to 'monopolize and restrain trade and commerce5 among the several states and to unlawfully fix prices to be paid the growers * * * all in violation of the anti-trust laws * * *'; and that each refiner no longer competed against the others as to the price to be paid the growers, but paid the same price on the agreed uniform basis of average net returns....It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act,15 even though the price-fixing was by purchasers,16 and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers.17 And even if it is assumed that the final aim of the conspiracy was control of the local sugar beet market, it does not follow that it is outside the scope of the Sherman Act. For monopolization of local business, when achieved by restraining interstate commerce, is condemned by the Act. Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser, 311 U.S. 255, 261, 61 S.Ct. 210, 213, 85 L.Ed. 173. And a conspiracy with the ultimate object of fixing local retail prices is within the Act, if the means adopted for its accomplishment reach beyond the boundaries of one state. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 65 S.Ct. 661, 89 L.Ed. 951.The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated. Cf. United States v. South-Fastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra, at page 553 of 322 U.S., page 1173 of 64 S.Ct., 88 L.Ed. 1440....Even without the uniform price provision and with full competition among the three refiners, their position is a dominating one. The growers' only competitive outlet is the one which exists when the refiners compete among themselves. There is no other market. The farmers' only alternative to dealing with one of the three refiners is to stop growing beets. They can neither plant nor sell except at the refiners' pleasure and on their terms. The refiners thus effectively control the quantity of beets grown, harvested and marketed, and consequently of sugar sold from the area in interstate commerce, even when they compete with each other. They dominate the entire industry. And their dominant position, together with the obstacles created by the necessity for large capital investment and the time required to make it productive, makes outlet through new competition practically impossible. Upon the allegations, it is absolutely so for any single growing season. A tighter or more all-inclusive monopolistic position hardly can be conceived.There were indeed two distinct effects flowing from the agreement for paying uniform growers' prices, one immediately upon the price received by the grower rendering it devoid of all competitive influence in amount; the other, the nee ssary and inevitable effect of that agreement, in the setting of the industry as a whole, to reduce competition in the interstate distribution of sugar....These restrictive and monopolistic effects, resulting necessarily from the practices allegedly intended to produce them, fall squarely within the Sherman Act's prohibitions, creating the very injuries they were designed to prevent, both to the public and to private individuals....It does not matter, contrary to respondent's view, that the growers contracting with the other two refiners may have been benefited, rather than harmed, by the combination's effects, even if that result is assumed to have followed...Both types of injury are present in this case, for in addition to the restraints put upon the public interest in the interstate sale of sugar, enhancing the refiner's controls, there are special injuries affecting the petitioners resulting from those effects as well as from the immediate operation of the uniform price arrangement itself.PS I'm rereading the dissent, and it seems like the dissent is essentially making the argument, NOT that a fundamentally important issue is producer vs consumer harm (which is what Wilken read into it), but rather that the fundementally important issue was local vs inter-state commerce. In other words, the inter-state sugar market wasn't harmed, and therefore LOCAL (emphasis mine) producer harm in a separate market didn't matter. So not a matter of defining harm, but a matter of defining jurisdiction. Consider:
It appears to me that the Court's opinion is based on assumptions of fact which the petitioner disclaimed in the court below. These assumptions are permissible inferences from the amended complaint only if we disregard the way in which the amendments came about.On hearing, the trial judge apparently considered that a cause of action would be stated only if the complaint alleged that the growing contracts affected the price of sugar in interstate commerce. But the contracts accompanying the pleadings indicated that the effects ran in the other direction. The market price of interstate sugar was the base on which the price of beets was to be figured....The trial judge therefore suggested that the references to restraint of trade in sugar in interstate commerce created an ambiguity in the complaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff, at the suggestion of the court and for the specific purpose of this appeal, filed an amended complaint which completely eliminated the charge that the agreements complained of affected the price of sugar in interstate commerce...The District Court then held that since no beets whatever moved in interstate commerce and since there was no charge in the amended complaint that the cost or quality of the product which did move in interstate commerce was in any way affected, no cause of action was stated. The appeal was taken and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Again, I'm not a lawyer (duh), but it seems to be that Jackson is making the argument that the inter-state sugar market was not actually affected (not that it wasn't affected good/bad, that it wasn't affected at all), and because the inter-state market wasn't affected, the Sherman Act didn't apply to the local-only effect. Specifically, that dissent disagreed with (bold mine):
The specific allegation is added that the sugar manufactured by respondent and the other northern California refiners from beets grown in the region 'was, during all of said period (1938 to 1942), sold in interstate commerce throughout the United States.'
...Further charges were that as 'a direct, expected and planned result of said conspiracy, the free and natural flow of commerce in interstate trade was intentionally hindered and obstructed...
Broadly petitioners regard the entire sequence of growing the beets, refining them into sugar and distributing it, under the arrangements set forth, as a chain of events so integrated and taking place in interstate commerce or in such close and intimate connection with it that, for purposes of applying the Sherman Act, the complete sequence is an entirety and no part of it can be segregated from the remainder so as to put it beyond the statute's grasp.
Respondent, on the contrary, broadly severs the phase or phases of growing and selling beets from the later ones of refining them and of marketing the sugar. The initial growing process together with sale of the beets, and it would seem also the intermediate stage of refining, are taken to be 'purely local,' since all occurred entirely within California; therefore were wholly intrastate events; and consequently were beyond the Sherman Act's reach.
Connected with this severance is the assertion that the complaint alleges no monopolistic or restrictive effects upon interstate commerce, but only such effects in the intrastate phases of the industry.
...In United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 297, 65 S.Ct. 661, 663, 89 L.Ed. 951, we said: 'It is true that this Court has on occasion determined that local conduct could be insulated from the operation of the Anti-Trust laws on the basis of the purely local aims of a combination, insofar as those aims were not motivated by the purpose of restraining commerce, and where the means used to achieve the purpose did not directly touch upon interstate commerce...
It is suggested that Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315, is inconsistent with our conclusion here. The Court there held first that the Sherman Act did not apply because the program was sponsored by the State of California. Contrary to the present suggestion, the opinion assumes that the relation between the intrastate and the interstate commerce in raisins was sufficient to justify federal regulation, if the state-sponsored program of prorating had been 'organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate.' 317 U.S. at page 350, 63 S.Ct. at page 313, 87 L.Ed. 315. The case therefore contains no suggestion, on the facts or on the law, contrary to the result now reached....
With no further support from the record, it has been assumed that the ambiguity so elided was the reference to restraint of interstate trade in sugar and hence the petitioners in making it stated themselves out of court.
Basically, the court case is NOT a "producer vs consumer harm" fight (even the defense acknowledges producer harm, and their primary cited defense is simply "purely local... therefore wholly intrastate... consequently beyond the Sherman Act's reach"). Neither plaintiff nor defense, majority nor dissent, actually argue that as a general principle, harm to producers is OK under Sherman. And indeed, as previously noted, it's stated over and over again the harm to producers is indeed a valid antitrust case.
Last edited 8/12/2014 3:53 PM by MrPacTen
Posted: 8/12/2014 3:41 PM
Posted: 8/12/2014 5:12 PM
BearEEGoodSir wrote: However, the judge DID award order the NCAA to pay all of the plaintiff's legal fees, so while the legal team likely did not make out like bandits, they are all getting their hourly fees related to the case compensated for them if the ruling holds.Yes. Attorneys fees are mandatory in any antitrust action whether for injunctive relief or damages. (I imagine there were no damages because the former players are not competitors with the NCAA, money damages are usually only for competitors harmed by the conduct, not all others indirectly harmed).I am completely certain that this relatively minor sum is not a huge part of the NCAA's decision to appeal.I agree.I am unsure as to whether the decision was actually limited in its scope to merely men's basketball and football. I believe that part of the rationale for the wording was so that schools would not be forced to set scholarships at levels that would bankrupt their programs, whether or not the sport was revenue generating. However, schools WOULD be allowed to up their scholarship values to a minimum of the caps listed in the decision. Hence, Utah gymnastics could feasibly decide to effectively offer higher scholarships by being willing to set up those trust funds for their gymnasts, just as Stanford could offer those funds for women's volleyball.IIRC correctly Wilken kicked out any attempt to introduce evidence of the economic effect of Title IX. I imagine that is an issue that will get some play on appeal.Essentially as long as a sport received television coverage from somewhere on any regular basis, a school could claim it desired to compensate the participating athletes for their image rights in such a trust structure. Certainly women's volleyball, baseball, and women's basketball could qualify.You are far too limited. Title IX will almost certainly require that women's sports get trust funds in an amount somewhere near what the men get, regardless of whether women's sports makes a red cent.(I'm not making any moral judgment on Title IX, just saying how it's equality and parity provisions will very likely work).This is fantastic for the Pac-12. Our ridiculously strong presence in the non-revenue sports outside of lacrosse and hockey could potentially be magnified because we would be stealing recruits with our more valuable scholarships. Well, at least Stanford, USC and Oregon would be doing a chunk of that. I think Title IX would operate in a more across the board sort of way.The poor public schools might have to ask boosters to fund the trust funds, but at least the boosters could do that sort of thing legally! Hmm... boost our program by offering $5000/year for each athlete you wish to support. There are some wealthier fans willing to jump on board such things.You raise an interesting point. Wilken's opinion assumes that the money for the trust fund would come from tv and likeness revenues, but I do not know if she wrote anything that would stop boosters from filling the funnel.
Posted: 8/12/2014 5:18 PM
PiratesRoost wrote: BearEEGoodSir wrote: However, the judge DID award order the NCAA to pay all of the plaintiff's legal fees, so while the legal team likely did not make out like bandits, they are all getting their hourly fees related to the case compensated for them if the ruling holds.Yes. Attorneys fees are mandatory in any antitrust action whether for injunctive relief or damages. (I imagine there were no damages because the former players are not competitors with the NCAA, money damages are usually only for competitors harmed by the conduct, not all others indirectly harmed).I am completely certain that this relatively minor sum is not a huge part of the NCAA's decision to appeal.I agree.I am unsure as to whether the decision was actually limited in its scope to merely men's basketball and football. I believe that part of the rationale for the wording was so that schools would not be forced to set scholarships at levels that would bankrupt their programs, whether or not the sport was revenue generating. However, schools WOULD be allowed to up their scholarship values to a minimum of the caps listed in the decision. Hence, Utah gymnastics could feasibly decide to effectively offer higher scholarships by being willing to set up those trust funds for their gymnasts, just as Stanford could offer those funds for women's volleyball.IIRC correctly Wilken kicked out any attempt to introduce evidence of the economic effect of Title IX. I imagine that is an issue that will get some play on appeal.Essentially as long as a sport received television coverage from somewhere on any regular basis, a school could claim it desired to compensate the participating athletes for their image rights in such a trust structure. Certainly women's volleyball, baseball, and women's basketball could qualify.You are far too limited. Title IX will almost certainly require that women's sports get trust funds in an amount somewhere near what the men get, regardless of whether women's sports makes a red cent.(I'm not making any moral judgment on Title IX, just saying how it's equality and parity provisions will very likely work).This is fantastic for the Pac-12. Our ridiculously strong presence in the non-revenue sports outside of lacrosse and hockey could potentially be magnified because we would be stealing recruits with our more valuable scholarships. Well, at least Stanford, USC and Oregon would be doing a chunk of that. I think Title IX would operate in a more across the board sort of way.The poor public schools might have to ask boosters to fund the trust funds, but at least the boosters could do that sort of thing legally! Hmm... boost our program by offering $5000/year for each athlete you wish to support. There are some wealthier fans willing to jump on board such things.You raise an interesting point. Wilken's opinion assumes that the money for the trust fund would come from tv and likeness revenues, but I do not know if she wrote anything that would stop boosters from filling the funnel.
Second, the NCAA could permit its schools to hold in trust limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue to be distributed to its student-athletes after they leave college or their eligibility expires. The NCAA could also prohibit schools from funding the stipends or payments held in trust with anything other than revenue generated from the use of the student-athletes’ own names, images, and likenesses.